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Why do some observations lead to broad generaliza-
tions, whereas other observations do not have as much
influence on people’s beliefs? One principle for evaluat-
ing evidence is the diversity principle, which states that
more diverse evidence should lead to stronger inferences
than a narrow sample of evidence does. This principle
has been influential in the history of science, capturing
scientists’ preference for testing a theory with a diverse
set of experiments, rather than repeatedly conducting the
same experiment or close replications (e.g., Salmon,
1984). There has also been a widespread effort by psy-
chologists to document how diversity of evidence affects
the way people carry out a variety of cognitive activities.
Thus far, sensitivity to diversity has been found in hy-
pothesis testing (Kincannon & Spellman, 2003; López,
1995) and diagnostic reasoning (Kim & Keil, 2003), as
well as in children’s reasoning about the physical world
(Hayes, Goodhew, Heit, & Gillan, 2003). Furthermore,
there is well-established evidence from categorization re-
search that more variable observations promote broader
or stronger generalizations (e.g., Fried & Holyoak, 1984;
Homa & Vosburgh, 1976; Posner & Keele, 1968).
In an influential study, Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López,
and Shafir (1990) documented diversity effects in adults’
informal inductive reasoning by using written arguments
such as the following: 
(1) Hippos require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
Rhinos require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
All mammals require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
(2) Hippos require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
Hamsters require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
All mammals require Vitamin K for the liver to function.
People judged arguments such as (2) to be stronger
than arguments such as (1), showing sensitivity to the
greater diversity of the premise categories in Argument 2
(hippos and hamsters).
In general, there has been a great deal of evidence of
adults, particularly Western college students, following
the diversity principle in inductive reasoning (see Heit,
2000, for a review; and see Heit & Hahn, 2001, for a con-
sideration of developmental work). The main exceptions
to the diversity effect seem to be due the use of other
knowledge, such as expertise, rather than diversity (e.g.,
López, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997; Proffitt,
Coley, & Medin, 2000). So these exceptions do not in-
validate the diversity principle so much as show that it
can be overridden by other knowledge (Heit, Hahn, &
Feeney, 2005). Indeed, the diversity effect is considered
one of the touchstone results explained by previous mod-
els of inductive reasoning (Heit, 1998; Osherson et al.,
1990; Sloman, 1993).
In a recent paper, Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes
(2003) reported further exceptions to the diversity prin-
ciple. Some of these exceptions involve diversity’s being
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According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been consider-
able evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be
particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of in-
ductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-property-
reinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here.
Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003).
The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, 
the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather
than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-by-
property-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this the-
ory does address other results. 
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overridden by other knowledge, particularly causal knowl-
edge. However, one phenomenon makes a more direct
challenge. In the nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement
effect, “if an otherwise diverse set of premises shares a
salient property not shared by the conclusion category,
the reinforcement of the property might weaken that ar-
gument relative to a related argument with less diverse
premises” (p. 523). This phenomenon is illustrated by
the following example:
(3) Penguins have property X.
Eagles have property X.
All animals have property X.
(4) Penguins have property Y.
Polar bears have property Y.
All animals have property Y.
When given a forced choice, subjects judged the two
animals that are taxonomically near (penguins and ea-
gles) to be more similar than the two animals that are tax-
onomically distant (penguins and polar bears). However,
when subjects were asked to assess the inductive strength
of each argument, Argument 4 was judged to be less con-
vincing than Argument 3. That is, the premise categories
in Argument 3 (penguins and eagles) appeared to de-
scribe less diverse evidence; yet this was the stronger ar-
gument. Intuitively, although penguins and polar bears
are taxonomically distant, they still share the property of
living in a cold climate. It might seem that Property Y
does not extend to all animals but applies only to animals
in cold climates. 
The theoretical importance of the nondiversity-by-
property-reinforcement effect is that it could not be ex-
plained by previous models of inductive reasoning. In-
stead, such a result would provide distinctive evidence
for Medin et al.’s (2003) own account, relevance theory,
which gives an explanation in terms of people looking
for distinctive properties of premise categories, on the
assumption that these categories were not chosen ran-
domly but, instead, were presented as part of a discourse
(see also Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). Relevance the-
ory refers to listeners drawing inferences about speak-
ers’ communicative goals against the context of the dis-
course and shared background knowledge.
Medin et al. (2003) investigated this effect, using sev-
eral stimulus sets, and overall did find significant evi-
dence. However, the results were not always consistent.
Sometimes, the similarity comparisons went in the di-
rection opposite to that of the anticipated one—that is,
sometimes taxonomically near animals were judged to
be more diverse than taxonomically distant animals. On
other occasions, the inductive strength judgments went
in the direction of diversity, rather than nondiversity.
Hence, we conducted a further test of this phenomenon,
with the aim of determining whether relevance theory
should be favored over previous accounts of inductive
reasoning. We used Medin et al.’s (2003) stimuli and, in
general, followed their procedure, except for collecting
similarity judgments in a different way. Rather than ask-
ing subjects to make a forced choice between two taxo-
nomically near animals and two taxonomically distant
animals, we asked subjects to make individual similarity
ratings corresponding to each of the arguments. This
procedure facilitated the key analysis, in which the cor-
relation between similarity and inductive strength was
examined, allowing consideration of the whole pattern
of results.
METHOD
Subjects
Two groups of volunteers were recruited on the University of
Durham’s Queen’s Campus. There were 72 subjects who made
judgments of inductive strength and 45 subjects who made similar-
ity ratings. Within the induction condition, there were two sub-
groups: Half were asked to give justifications for each response,
and half were not. The reason for asking for justifications was that
Medin et al. (2003) had done so, and this design allowed us to ex-
amine whether providing justifications would affect responses. 
Materials and Procedure
There were seven pairs of inductive arguments, adapted from the
nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement items in Medin et al. (2003),
as is shown in Table 1. Each pair included an argument based on
two taxonomically near animals (such as penguin–eagle) and an 
argument based on two taxonomically distant animals (such as 
penguin–polar bear). The taxonomically distant animals nonethe-
less shared certain salient properties (such as living in a cold habi-
tat for penguin–polar bear). The first five pairs in Table 1 had been
validated in terms of similarity judgments collected by Medin et al
(2003). That is, when given a forced choice as to whether the taxo-
nomically near animals or the taxonomically distant animals were
more similar, subjects tended to choose the taxonomically near
items. The final two pairs produced the opposite pattern of simi-
larity judgments.
Table 1
Stimuli and Results
Taxonomically Inductive Taxonomically Inductive
Near Strength (%) Similarity Distant Strength (%) Similarity
Penguin–eagle 43.6 3.18 Penguin–polar bear 40.1 4.18
Kangaroo–elephant 50.1 2.16 Kangaroo–frog 49.4 3.02
Camel–rhino 52.9 2.98 Camel–desert rat 39.5 4.18
Polar bear–antelope 52.6 2.16 Polar bear–penguin 40.1 4.18
Chimpanzee–cow 51.2 1.89 Chimpanzee–dolphin 55.9 2.27
Bat–elephant 51.1 1.69 Bat–robin 40.0 4.07
Pig–whale 61.3 1.64 Pig-chicken 48.3 3.53
M 51.8 2.24 M 44.7 3.63
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The inductive arguments were given as part of a pen-and-paper
survey with 15 questions. The first 2 questions were filler items of
a similar form to the main items. The remaining questions were in
one of two different random orders and were of the following form: 
Given the facts that:
Penguins have Property J.
Eagles have Property J.
How likely is it that:
All animals have Property J?
Each question contained a property referred to by a different let-
ter. Note that whereas Medin et al. (2003) used a variety of conclu-
sion categories, we consistently used animals, so as to facilitate the
correlational analysis across items. Although the polar bear–penguin
argument was used in two different pairs by Medin et al. (2003), we
collected data for this argument only once. The subjects were asked
to respond to each question on a 0%–100% scale. Half the subjects
were also asked to justify each judgment on an additional line.
The similarity condition used a survey with the same 13 pairs as
those shown in Table 1, presented in one of two random orders. Cor-
responding taxonomically near and taxonomically distant pairs did
not appear as adjacent items. The instructions were to judge “how
similar are each of these pairs of animals” on 1–9 scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater similarity. 
RESULTS
A preliminary analysis did not reveal any influence of
justifications in the induction condition. Hence, for sub-
sequent analyses, the data were pooled over the two sub-
conditions. The inductive strength ratings for each argu-
ment are shown in Table 1. Overall, there were higher
ratings for taxonomically near arguments (51.8%) than
for taxonomically distant arguments [44.7%; paired
t(71)  4.15, p  .001]. The results were fairly consis-
tent across items. That is, the taxonomically near argu-
ment had greater strength than did the taxonomically
distant argument for six of seven pairs. Note that Medin
et al. (2003) also found higher inductive strength ratings
for taxonomically near arguments.
The similarity ratings for each argument are also shown
in Table 1. Overall, there were higher similarity ratings
for the taxonomically distant arguments (3.63) than for
the taxonomically near arguments [2.24; t(44)  7.27,
p  .001]. Indeed, each pair of arguments showed this
pattern. Note that here, our results depart from those of
Medin et al. (2003), who found, for the first five pairs, a
tendency to say that the taxonomically near arguments
were more similar than the taxonomically distant argu-
ments. Putting together all these results, it appears that
there was a diversity effect overall. That is, the taxo-
nomically near arguments were judged as more diverse,
and they were judged as being inductively stronger.
The final analysis concerned the correlation between
inductive ratings and similarity judgments, taken over
the 13 unique arguments. This correlation was .86
( p  .001). That is, when the two animals in an induc-
tive argument were judged as more diverse, in terms of
having lower similarity ratings, the inductive strength of
that argument tended to be higher. Hence, the correla-
tional analysis also showed a diversity effect. Further-
more, the results went in the same direction when corre-
lations within each of the two subsets of arguments were
considered (r.62, n.s., for the 7 taxonomically near
arguments, and r.98, p .001, for the 6 taxonomi-
cally distant arguments). Although the correlation was
not quite statistically significant within one of the sub-
sets, as might be expected when a correlation is com-
puted over a small number of items, these analyses do
suggest that the overall pattern is consistent across items.
DISCUSSION
This experiment showed an overall diversity effect,
using materials that had been predicted by relevance the-
ory to show nondiversity by property reinforcement.
This experiment replicated Medin et al’s. (2003) results
for inductive judgments but showed a different pattern
for similarity judgments. Note that the pattern of induc-
tive judgments from Medin et al. (2003) was replicated
despite changes in the conclusion categories. These con-
clusion categories were not presented in the similarity
condition, but the different pattern of similarity judg-
ments could possibly reflect other methodological dif-
ferences. Medin et al. (2003) asked subjects to make
forced-choice judgments based on “general similarity,
not on associations” and found that taxonomically near
animals (e.g., penguin–eagle) tended to be chosen over
taxonomically distant animals (e.g., penguin–polar bear).
It is possible that the forced-choice method, or telling
subjects to ignore associations, could have focused at-
tention on the biological characteristics of the animals,
rather than on their behavior or living environment. In-
deed, it could be argued that telling subjects to ignore as-
sociations is desirable, because it might facilitate a clear-
cut assessment of similarity without undue attention to
shared properties, such as living in a cold habitat. In the
extreme, similarity judgments themselves might be af-
fected by a property-reinforcement effect.
Therefore, in a posttest, we asked 68 additional sub-
jects from the same population to make forced-choice
similarity judgments on the seven taxonomically near
versus taxonomically distant comparisons. There were
35 subjects in the basic condition, in which people were
asked simply to choose which pair of categories was
most similar. There were 33 subjects in the enhanced
condition, which had additional instructions to “base
your judgments on general similarity, and not on associ-
ations.” The materials were presented in two random or-
ders. In the basic condition, the taxonomically distant
pairs were chosen 71.0% (SE 3.23%) of the time, sig-
nificantly different from chance [t(34) 6.20, p .001].
Likewise, in the enhanced condition, the taxonomically
distant pairs were chosen 65.4% (SE  3.73%) of the
time [t(32)  4.12, p  .001]. Although the proportion
of taxonomically distant choices was slightly reduced in
the enhanced condition, the difference between condi-
tions was not statistically significant [t(66) 1.15]. The
two conditions were pooled together for an item analysis.
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For six of the seven comparisons, the proportion of tax-
onomically distant choices was greater than 50%. In five
of these six comparisons, the proportion was significantly
different from chance, using a binomial test ( p  .05).
There was just one comparison (chimpanzee–cow versus
chimpanzee–dolphin) for which the proportion of taxo-
nomically distant choices (32%) was significantly less
than 50%.
In sum, the forced-choice similarity judgments in our
posttest were consistent with the individual similarity
ratings in the experiment. Taxonomically distant pairs
were generally judged as more similar (with one excep-
tion), and because these had also been judged as induc-
tively weaker, there was a diversity effect overall. Our
forced-choice results were not consistent with those re-
ported by Medin et al. (2003). Although our task was
comparable to that in Medin et al. (2003), and the sam-
ple size was larger (68 in total, as compared with 20), it
is possible that other methodological differences could
have led to the different results, such as the different sub-
ject populations (Britain vs. Belgium) and the fact that
Medin et al.’s (2003) similarity test contained 14 addi-
tional questions not used in our own posttest. Although
we acknowledge that similarity judgments are context
dependent (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993), we did
not find much effect of using a forced-choice, rather than
a similarity-rating, procedure, nor was there much effect
of telling people to ignore associations.
Further Experimental Evidence
In two further experiments, we (Heit et al., 2005) have
examined another stimulus set for which relevance the-
ory would predict nondiversity by property reinforce-
ment. These stimuli were adapted from Heit and Rubin-
stein (1994), who also had created taxonomically near
pairs of animals (such as whales and bears) and taxo-
nomically distant pairs of animals (such as whales and
tunas). Heit and Rubinstein had collected two kinds of
similarity ratings for these stimuli; similarity with re-
spect to anatomy and similarity with respect to behavior.
The taxonomically distant animals were overall consid-
ered less similar in terms of anatomy than the taxonom-
ically near animals. However, the taxonomically distant
animals were considered more similar in terms of be-
havior than the taxonomically near animals were. In
other words, the taxonomically distant pairs were con-
sidered more diverse overall, but they still shared some
salient properties.
The two further experiments followed the same proce-
dure as that for the induction condition of the main exper-
iment reported here. The test questions in the first ex-
periment were of the following form:
Given the facts that:
Whales have property C.
Bears have property C.
How likely is it that:
All animals have property C?
The second experiment emphasized that the property in
question referred to an animal’s behavior, in case this
would encourage a focus on other behavioral features and,
possibly, make a nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement
effect more likely. Nonetheless, both experiments showed
diversity effects, rather than nondiversity effects. In gen-
eral, greater diversity in terms of anatomical similarity
led to stronger inductive judgments. For example, the
correlation between anatomical similarity ratings and in-
ductive strength judgments was .85 in the first experi-
ment and .64 in the second experiment. (There was ap-
proximately a zero correlation between behavioral
similarity and inductive strength.) Hence, in three exper-
iments for which relevance theory had predicted nondi-
versity by property reinforcement, we have instead
found diversity effects.
Reassessing Relevance Theory
The theoretical implication of the results is that these
diversity effects can be explained by previous models of
inductive reasoning (Heit, 1998; Osherson et al., 1990;
Sloman, 1993). Hence, the results do not serve as dis-
tinctive evidence for Medin et al.’s (2003) relevance the-
ory over other accounts.
However, Medin et al. (2003) presented seven other
novel phenomena that would also serve to distinguish rel-
evance theory from previous models of inductive reason-
ing. For example, in the causal nondiversity phenomenon,
causal knowledge is used to override the usual diversity
effect, as is illustrated by the following arguments:
(5) Sparrows have property X.
Dogs have property X.
All living things have property X.
(6) Sparrows have property Y.
Seeds have property Y.
All living things have property Y.
In this example, sparrows and seeds are judged more
diverse than sparrows and dogs, yet Argument 5 is judged
stronger than Argument 6, because people consider the
causal mechanism for transferring properties from seeds
to sparrows and judge that this mechanism would not
apply generally to all living things. This kind of causal
reasoning could not be explained by previous models.
More generally, Medin et al. (2003) reported a substan-
tial body of evidence for which relevance theory would
provide a distinctive explanation.
In conclusion, although the relevance theory of category-
based induction appears to predict when other sources of
background knowledge will overcome diversity, the ev-
idence presented here suggests that, in the absence of
such information, the diversity effect is robust.
REFERENCES
Fried, L. S., & Holyoak, K. J. (1984). Induction of category distribu-
tions: A framework for classification learning. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 10, 234-257.
344 HEIT AND FEENEY
Hayes, B. K., Goodhew, A., Heit, E., & Gillan, J. (2003). The role of
diverse instruction in conceptual change. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology, 86, 253-276.
Heit, E. (1998). A Bayesian analysis of some forms of inductive rea-
soning. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds.), Rational models of cog-
nition (pp. 248-274). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heit, E. (2000). Properties of inductive reasoning. Psychonomic Bul-
letin & Review, 7, 569-592.
Heit, E., & Hahn, U. (2001). Diversity-based reasoning in children.
Cognitive Psychology, 43, 243-273.
Heit, E., Hahn, U., & Feeney, A. (2005). Defending diversity. In W.-K.
Ahn, R. L. Goldstone, A. B. Markman, & P. Wolff (Eds.), Catego-
rization inside and outside of the laboratory: Essays in honor of Dou-
glas L. Medin (pp. 87-99). Washington, DC: American Psychologi-
cal Association.
Heit, E., & Rubinstein, J. (1994). Similarity and property effects in in-
ductive reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, & Cognition, 20, 411-422.
Homa, D., & Vosburgh, R. (1976). Category breadth and the abstrac-
tion of prototypical information. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Human Learning & Memory, 2, 322-330.
Kim, N. S., & Keil, F. C. (2003). From symptoms to causes: Diversity
effects in diagnostic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 31, 155-165.
Kincannon, A., & Spellman, B. A. (2003). The use of category and
similarity information in limiting hypotheses. Memory & Cognition,
31, 114-132.
López, A. (1995). The diversity principle in the testing of arguments.
Memory & Cognition, 23, 374-382.
López, A., Atran, S., Coley, J. D., Medin, D. L., & Smith, E. E.
(1997). The tree of life: Universal and cultural features of folkbiolog-
ical taxonomies and inductions. Cognitive Psychology, 32, 251-295.
Medin, D. L., Coley, J. D., Storms, G., & Hayes, B. K. (2003). A rel-
evance theory of induction. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 517-
532.
Medin, D. L., Goldstone, R. L., & Gentner, D. (1993). Respects for
similarity. Psychological Review, 100, 254-278.
Osherson, D. N., Smith, E. E., Wilkie, O., López, A., & Shafir, E.
(1990). Category-based induction. Psychological Review, 97, 185-200.
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of abstract ideas.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 77, 353-363.
Proffitt, J. B., Coley, J. D., & Medin, D. L. (2000). Expertise and
category-based induction. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 26, 811-828.
Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure
of the world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sloman, S. A. (1993). Feature-based induction. Cognitive Psychology,
25, 231-280.
Tenenbaum, J. B., & Griffiths, T. L. (2001). Generalization, similar-
ity, and Bayesian inference. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 24, 629-641.
(Manuscript received December 24, 2003;
revision accepted for publication June 7, 2004.)
